From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
To: "Schimpe, Christina" <christina.schimpe@intel.com>
Cc: gdb-patches@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/12] gdb, gdbserver: Add support of Intel shadow stack pointer register.
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2025 00:13:38 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <877c63ix3x.fsf@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241220200501.324191-7-christina.schimpe@intel.com> (Christina Schimpe's message of "Fri, 20 Dec 2024 20:04:55 +0000")
"Schimpe, Christina" <christina.schimpe@intel.com> writes:
> This patch adds the user mode register PL3_SSP which is part of the
> Intel(R) Control-Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature for support
> of shadow stack.
> For now, only native and remote debugging support for shadow stack
> userspace on amd64 linux are covered by this patch including 64 bit and
> x32 support. 32 bit support is not covered due to missing linux kernel
Nit: Linux (uppercase l)
> support.
<snip>
> diff --git a/gdb/arch/i386.c b/gdb/arch/i386.c
> index 4a39028a472..59daaa4c583 100644
> --- a/gdb/arch/i386.c
> +++ b/gdb/arch/i386.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> #include "../features/i386/32bit-avx512.c"
> #include "../features/i386/32bit-segments.c"
> #include "../features/i386/pkeys.c"
> +#include "../features/i386/32bit-ssp.c"
>
> /* See i386.h. */
>
> @@ -66,5 +67,8 @@ i386_create_target_description (uint64_t xstate_bv_mask, bool is_linux,
> if (xstate_bv_mask & X86_XSTATE_PKRU)
> regnum = create_feature_i386_pkeys (tdesc.get (), regnum);
>
> + if (xstate_bv_mask & X86_XSTATE_CET_U)
> + regnum = create_feature_i386_32bit_ssp (tdesc.get (), regnum);
> +
> return tdesc.release ();
> }
The patch description mentions that "32 bit support is not covered due
to missing linux kernel support". Is this change useful, or is it
unreachable code?
> diff --git a/gdb/testsuite/lib/gdb.exp b/gdb/testsuite/lib/gdb.exp
> index a86f534528c..fc35456f1d3 100644
> --- a/gdb/testsuite/lib/gdb.exp
> +++ b/gdb/testsuite/lib/gdb.exp
> @@ -4225,6 +4225,75 @@ gdb_caching_proc allow_tsx_tests {} {
> return $allow_tsx_tests
> }
>
> +# Run a test on the target to check if it supports x86 shadow stack. Return 1
> +# if shadow stack is enabled, 0 otherwise.
> +
> +gdb_caching_proc allow_ssp_tests {} {
> + global srcdir subdir gdb_prompt hex
> +
> + set me "allow_ssp_tests"
> +
> + if { ![istarget i?86-*-*] && ![istarget x86_64-*-* ] } {
> + verbose "$me: target known to not support shadow stack."
> + return 0
> + }
> +
> + # There is no need to check the actual HW in addition to ptrace support.
> + # We need both checks and ptrace will tell us about the HW state.
> + set compile_flags "{additional_flags=-fcf-protection=return}"
> + set src { int main() { return 0; } }
> + if {![gdb_simple_compile $me $src executable $compile_flags]} {
> + return 0
> + }
> +
> + save_vars { ::env(GLIBC_TUNABLES) } {
> +
> + append_environment GLIBC_TUNABLES "glibc.cpu.hwcaps" "SHSTK"
> +
> + # No error message, compilation succeeded so now run it via gdb.
> + gdb_exit
> + gdb_start
> + gdb_reinitialize_dir $srcdir/$subdir
> + gdb_load $obj
> + if {![runto_main]} {
> + return 0
There should be a call to "remote_file build delete $obj" here as well.
> + }
> + set shadow_stack_disabled_re "(<unavailable>)"
> + if {[istarget *-*-linux*]} {
> + # Starting with v6.6., the Linux kernel supports CET shadow stack.
> + # Dependent on the target we can see a nullptr or "<unavailable>"
> + # when shadow stack is supported by HW and the linux kernel but
Nit: Linux
> + # not enabled for the current thread (for example due to a lack
> + # of compiler or glibc support for -fcf-protection).
> + set shadow_stack_disabled_re "$shadow_stack_disabled_re|(.*0x0)"
> + }
<snip>
> diff --git a/gdb/x86-linux-nat.c b/gdb/x86-linux-nat.c
> index d1fece717a7..5bbd4640e30 100644
> --- a/gdb/x86-linux-nat.c
> +++ b/gdb/x86-linux-nat.c
> @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
> #include "nat/x86-linux.h"
> #include "nat/x86-linux-dregs.h"
> #include "nat/linux-ptrace.h"
> +#include "x86-tdep.h"
> #include "nat/x86-linux-tdesc.h"
>
> /* linux_nat_target::low_new_fork implementation. */
> @@ -97,11 +98,10 @@ const struct target_desc *
> x86_linux_nat_target::read_description ()
> {
> /* The x86_linux_tdesc_for_tid call only reads xcr0 the first time it is
> - called. The mask is stored in XSTATE_BV_STORAGE and reused on
> - subsequent calls. Note that GDB currently supports features for user
> - state components only. However, once supervisor state components are
> - supported in GDB XSTATE_BV_STORAGE will not be configured based on
> - xcr0 only. */
> + called. Also it checks the enablement state of features which are
> + not configured in xcr0, such as CET shadow stack. Once the supported
The "not" above should be removed.
> + features are identified, the XSTATE_BV_STORAGE value is configured
> + accordingly and preserved for subsequent calls of this function. */
> static uint64_t xstate_bv_storage;
>
> if (inferior_ptid == null_ptid)
> @@ -215,6 +215,46 @@ x86_linux_get_thread_area (pid_t pid, void *addr, unsigned int *base_addr)
> }
> \f
>
> +/* See x86-linux-nat.h. */
> +
> +void
> +x86_linux_fetch_ssp (regcache *regcache, const int tid)
> +{
> + uint64_t ssp = 0x0;
> + iovec iov {&ssp, sizeof (ssp)};
> +
> + /* The shadow stack may be enabled and disabled at runtime. Reading the
> + ssp might fail as shadow stack was not activated for the current
> + thread. We don't want to show a warning but silently return. The
> + register will be shown as unavailable for the user. */
> + if (ptrace (PTRACE_GETREGSET, tid, NT_X86_SHSTK, &iov) != 0)
> + return;
In case the ptrace fails and there is already an old value for ssp in
regcache, shouldn't it be removed from it?
> +
> + x86_supply_ssp (regcache, ssp);
> +}
> +
> +/* See x86-linux-nat.h. */
> +
> +void
> +x86_linux_store_ssp (const regcache *regcache, const int tid)
> +{
> + uint64_t ssp = 0x0;
> + iovec iov {&ssp, sizeof (ssp)};
> + x86_collect_ssp (regcache, ssp);
> +
> + /* Starting with v6.6., the Linux kernel supports CET shadow stack.
> + Dependent on the target the ssp register can be unavailable or
> + nullptr when shadow stack is supported by HW and the linux kernel but
Nit: Linux
> + not enabled for the current thread. In case of nullptr, GDB tries to
> + restore the shadow stack pointer after an inferior call. The ptrace
> + call with PTRACE_SETREGSET will fail here with errno ENODEV. We
> + don't want to throw an error in this case but silently continue. */
> + errno = 0;
> + if ((ptrace (PTRACE_SETREGSET, tid, NT_X86_SHSTK, &iov) != 0)
> + && (errno != ENODEV))
> + perror_with_name (_("Failed to write pl3_ssp register"));
Same question here: if the ptrace call fails shouldn't the ssp value in
regcache be removed?
> +}
> +
> void _initialize_x86_linux_nat ();
> void
> _initialize_x86_linux_nat ()
> diff --git a/gdb/x86-linux-nat.h b/gdb/x86-linux-nat.h
> index 3c2241bb0b6..d5dc1908090 100644
> --- a/gdb/x86-linux-nat.h
> +++ b/gdb/x86-linux-nat.h
> @@ -92,4 +92,15 @@ struct x86_linux_nat_target : public x86_nat_target<linux_nat_target>
> extern ps_err_e x86_linux_get_thread_area (pid_t pid, void *addr,
> unsigned int *base_addr);
>
> +/* Fetch the value of the shadow stack pointer register from process/thread
> + TID and store it to GDB's register cache. */
> +
> +extern void x86_linux_fetch_ssp (regcache *regcache, const int tid);
> +
> +/* Read the value of the shadow stack pointer from GDB's register cache
> + and store it in the shadow stack pointer register of process/thread TID.
> + Throw an error in case of failure. */
> +
> +extern void x86_linux_store_ssp (const regcache *regcache, const int tid);
> +
> #endif /* GDB_X86_LINUX_NAT_H */
> diff --git a/gdb/x86-tdep.c b/gdb/x86-tdep.c
> index e50b5fb9fa4..08fb0e8d82d 100644
> --- a/gdb/x86-tdep.c
> +++ b/gdb/x86-tdep.c
> @@ -17,10 +17,32 @@
> You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
> along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
>
> +#include "defs.h"
defs.h is now included in all GDB files via the gcc command line, and
shouldn't be #included anymore. See commit 18d2988e5da8 ("gdb,
gdbserver, gdbsupport: remove includes of early headers") and commit
ab7daea3ad0d ("gdb, gdbserver, gdbsupport: include early header files
with `-include`").
> +#include "i386-tdep.h"
> #include "x86-tdep.h"
> #include "symtab.h"
--
Thiago
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-06 3:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-20 20:04 [PATCH 00/12] Add CET shadow stack support Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 01/12] gdb, testsuite: Rename set_sanitizer_default to append_environment Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-28 13:45 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 13:07 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-30 14:27 ` Tom de Vries
2025-01-30 16:39 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 02/12] gdbserver: Add optional runtime register set type Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-28 13:35 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 10:28 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-30 13:53 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 17:43 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 2:59 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-06 12:15 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 03/12] gdbserver: Add assert in x86_linux_read_description Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:00 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 04/12] gdb: Sync up x86-gcc-cpuid.h with cpuid.h from gcc 14 branch Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:03 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-06 12:23 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 05/12] gdb, gdbserver: Use xstate_bv for target description creation on x86 Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-30 14:51 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 16:45 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:09 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-06 12:33 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 06/12] gdb, gdbserver: Add support of Intel shadow stack pointer register Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:13 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann [this message]
2025-02-06 14:33 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-08 3:44 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 07/12] gdb, bfd: amd64 linux coredump support with shadow stack Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:15 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-07 11:54 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 08/12] gdb: Handle shadow stack pointer register unwinding for amd64 linux Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-30 14:29 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 16:11 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-30 16:13 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 16:40 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:30 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-06 14:40 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 09/12] gdb, gdbarch: Enable inferior calls for shadow stack support Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:31 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-06 15:07 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-08 3:57 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-10 8:37 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:04 ` [PATCH 10/12] gdb: Implement amd64 linux shadow stack support for inferior calls Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:34 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-07 11:55 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:05 ` [PATCH 11/12] gdb, gdbarch: Introduce gdbarch method to get the shadow stack pointer Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-28 20:27 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 10:33 ` Luis Machado
2025-01-30 12:34 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-30 13:42 ` Guinevere Larsen
2025-02-06 3:35 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-07 12:01 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-08 4:03 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-10 8:58 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-11 1:53 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-15 3:45 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-16 10:45 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-20 8:48 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-21 5:10 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-21 9:41 ` Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:05 ` [PATCH 12/12] gdb: Enable displaced stepping with shadow stack on amd64 linux Schimpe, Christina
2024-12-20 20:14 ` Eli Zaretskii
2025-01-02 9:04 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-02 9:15 ` Eli Zaretskii
2025-02-06 3:37 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-01-16 14:01 ` [PING][PATCH 00/12] Add CET shadow stack support Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-27 9:44 ` [PING*2][PATCH " Schimpe, Christina
2025-01-30 15:01 ` [PATCH " Guinevere Larsen
2025-01-30 17:46 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-04 3:57 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2025-02-04 9:40 ` Schimpe, Christina
2025-02-06 3:44 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
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