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From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <sipoyare@redhat.com>
To: Tom Tromey <tom@tromey.com>
Cc: Andrew Burgess <aburgess@redhat.com>, gdb-patches@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] gdb: extend SECURITY.txt to highlight additional remote debugging risks
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 12:10:10 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f170a6f4-6703-4935-b045-4ae689533c04@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87jynk48wz.fsf@tromey.com>

On 10/14/26 11:08 AM, Tom Tromey wrote:
>>> +  Additionally, when GDB connects to a remote target, it will, by
>>> +  default, automatically download the executable and shared libraries
>>> +  from the remote system and parse them locally, without prompting the
>>> +  user.  This means that the risks described above relating to parsing
>>> +  malformed executables also apply when performing remote debugging.
>>> +  If the remote target is untrusted, or the connection to the remote
>>> +  target is untrusted, malicious or malformed binaries could be served
> 
>> This is a good guideline, but does not make clear if bugs in this
>> processing will be treated as security issues.  This is true for the
>> line above as well, which this paragraph intends to augment - it warns
>> the user that such behaviour is not good, but does not make a
>> definitive statement whether bugs related to them will be treated as
>> security issues or not.
> 
> I think it's relatively clear given these paragraphs:
> 
>    GDB is not meant to be offered as a service (that is, offered
>    over an insecure connection to non-local users), and so denial of
>    service attacks targeting GDB itself, or other bugs that target
>    this use case, are not considered a security bug.
> ...
>    Any issues that arise from running an untrusted program outside of a
>    secure environment are not security bugs in GDB.  Any issues that
>    arise from running an untrusted program through GDB inside a secure
>    environment are only security bugs if GDB is required in order to
>    trigger the issue.
It's probably this clause that applies instead of the second one though, 
since it's about loading an executable without running it:

   Any bug in GDB or gdbserver that can trigger arbitrary code
   execution without the program being debugged having been executed by
   a user command, is considered a security bug, e.g. if loading a
   program into GDB could trigger arbitrary code execution, then this
   is a security issue.

except that the "if the remote target is untrusted" brings a new 
variable into the picture.  The policy assumes a trusted connection (the 
first clause you quoted) but an untrusted target (the new clause), i.e. 
an untrusted endpoint, which makes it moot.  This inconsistency leaves a 
gap in what's considered a security issue.

Sid


  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-14 16:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-12 13:49 [PATCH 0/5] SECURITY.txt changes Andrew Burgess
2026-10-12 13:49 ` [PATCH 1/5] gdb: fix minor grammar error in SECURITY.txt Andrew Burgess
2026-10-14 15:02   ` Tom Tromey
2026-10-12 13:49 ` [PATCH 2/5] gdb: extend SECURITY.txt to highlight additional remote debugging risks Andrew Burgess
2026-10-13 15:22   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2026-10-14 15:08     ` Tom Tromey
2026-10-14 16:10       ` Siddhesh Poyarekar [this message]
2026-10-16 14:24         ` Andrew Burgess
2026-10-16 14:27           ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2026-10-12 13:49 ` [PATCH 3/5] gdb: extend SECURITY.txt discussion of DWARF/BFD parser bugs Andrew Burgess
2026-10-13 15:30   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2026-10-14 15:12     ` Tom Tromey
2026-10-14 16:16       ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2026-10-14 17:28         ` Carlos O'Donell
2026-10-12 13:49 ` [PATCH 4/5] gdb: in SECURITY.txt, add notes on reporting exec and debug bugs Andrew Burgess
2026-10-12 13:49 ` [PATCH 5/5] gdb: improve SECURITY.txt relating to embedded language bugs Andrew Burgess
2026-10-14 15:44 ` [PATCH 0/5] SECURITY.txt changes Tom Tromey

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