[PATCH 2/5] gdb: extend SECURITY.txt to highlight additional remote debugging risks

[Andrew Burgess <aburgess@redhat.com>]

I had cause to re-read the SECURITY.txt document recently, and I felt
that it wasn't really clear on one aspect of using GDB with gdbserver
(or any remote target).

I felt that the text wasn't explicit enough about how a remote target
can download executables and libraries to GDB, and how GDB can then
parse these files.  When we consider the sort of bugs we see,
especially in BFD and the DWARF parser, when it comes to badly
formatted files, I thought it was worth calling this out.
---
 gdb/SECURITY.txt | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/gdb/SECURITY.txt b/gdb/SECURITY.txt
index f4ddebe3f03..63e110055db 100644
--- a/gdb/SECURITY.txt
+++ b/gdb/SECURITY.txt
@@ -210,6 +210,18 @@ Security Realities Of The GDB Project
   user to protect this connection, for example, by only starting
   gdbserver within a secure network.
 
+  Additionally, when GDB connects to a remote target, it will, by
+  default, automatically download the executable and shared libraries
+  from the remote system and parse them locally, without prompting the
+  user.  This means that the risks described above relating to parsing
+  malformed executables also apply when performing remote debugging.
+  If the remote target is untrusted, or the connection to the remote
+  target is untrusted, malicious or malformed binaries could be served
+  to GDB, resulting in any of the issues described above.  Users
+  should apply the same precautions when performing remote debugging
+  as when analysing an untrusted binary locally, including running GDB
+  in a secure, sandboxed environment.
+
 Reporting Non-Security Bugs
 ---------------------------
 
-- 
2.25.4