From: Paul Pluzhnikov <ppluzhnikov@google.com>
To: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Kettenis <mark.kettenis@xs4all.nl>,
joseph@codesourcery.com, drow@false.org,
gdb-patches@sourceware.org, pedro@codesourcery.com,
uweigand@de.ibm.com
Subject: Re: RFC: Longjmp vs LD_POINTER_GUARD revisited
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2009 15:40:00 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8ac60eac0911160739x6bbc1237w49556339ed855e66@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <y0mbpj2wlhu.fsf@fche.csb>
On Mon, Nov 16, 2009 at 7:13 AM, Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com> wrote:
> Well, it's nothing personal. If glibc made it trivial decrypt this
> stuff on demand, it'd be just as easy for an attacker.
That's exactly my point: the process itself can trivially discover the
problem by executing two setjmps with known resume addresses (an
implementation I did in my previous job (for a Valgrind-like checker)
took less than 20 lines of assembly), so I wonder how much of a
deterrent this really is.
> Maybe this is a case for something akin to libthread_db.
Hmm, libc_db to subsume libthread_db, and answer all kinds of
questions about glibc internals; wouldn't GDB's life be easier! OTOH,
if the sysadmin is not careful to remove libc_db from a production
system, then the attacker could just dlopen libc_db and hack away.
--
Paul Pluzhnikov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-11-16 15:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-11-15 17:35 Daniel Jacobowitz
2009-11-15 18:06 ` Eli Zaretskii
2009-11-15 18:30 ` Paul Pluzhnikov
2009-11-15 22:36 ` Daniel Jacobowitz
2009-11-15 23:06 ` Paul Pluzhnikov
2009-11-16 14:37 ` Daniel Jacobowitz
2009-11-16 14:55 ` Pedro Alves
2009-11-16 14:56 ` Pedro Alves
2009-11-16 15:05 ` Pedro Alves
2009-11-16 17:50 ` Daniel Jacobowitz
2009-11-15 18:39 ` Joseph S. Myers
2009-11-15 21:52 ` Mark Kettenis
2009-11-15 22:37 ` Daniel Jacobowitz
2009-11-16 15:15 ` Frank Ch. Eigler
2009-11-16 15:40 ` Paul Pluzhnikov [this message]
2009-11-16 15:43 ` Paul Pluzhnikov
2009-11-16 16:19 ` Mark Kettenis
2009-11-16 15:59 ` Mark Kettenis
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