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From: Eli Zaretskii <eliz@gnu.org>
To: Andrew Burgess <aburgess@redhat.com>
Cc: gdb-patches@sourceware.org, siddhesh@redhat.com,
	kevinb@redhat.com, simark@simark.ca, felix.willgerodt@intel.com,
	paulkoning@comcast.net
Subject: Re: [RFC] Adding a SECURITY policy for GDB
Date: Sun, 04 Feb 2024 19:18:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8634u82lna.fsf@gnu.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <877cjk5jo5.fsf@redhat.com> (message from Andrew Burgess on Sun,  04 Feb 2024 15:32:58 +0000)

> From: Andrew Burgess <aburgess@redhat.com>
> Cc: gdb-patches@sourceware.org, siddhesh@redhat.com, kevinb@redhat.com,
>  simark@simark.ca, felix.willgerodt@intel.com, paulkoning@comcast.net
> Date: Sun, 04 Feb 2024 15:32:58 +0000
> 
> >>   Any bugs in GDB that result in execution of the program being
> >>   debugged without a user issued GDB command triggering execution
> >                             ^^^^^^
> > "issuing"
> >
> >>   (either from the GDB command line, a GDB configuration file, or from
> >>   the GDB prompt) are considered security bugs.
> >
> > Is any execution of the program triggered by starting GDB considered
> > "a command issued by the user"?  IOW, are we sure GDB will never cause
> > some program code to be executed just as result of the user saying
> >
> >   $ gdb ./program
> >
> > ?  The above text seems to assume that any such execution at startup
> > must be the result of some command-line argument or some configuration
> > file, but is that 110% certain, and are we sure this will _never_
> > change?
> 
> Am I 110% certain?  No.  I'm never going to claim that level of
> certainty on a topic.  But I am 99% certain.
> 
> Am I sure this will _never change?  No.  But that's OK.
> 
> This document is about writing down an agreed project position on this
> behaviour today.
> 
> If tomorrow someone wants to propose a patch where 'gdb ./prog' would
> automatically run './prog' then they are welcome to do so.  But part of
> that patch would require updating the SECURITY.txt document, and
> hopefully, by touching the SECURITY.txt document, this would trigger a
> conversation about whether we actually wanted to make that change.
> 
> But that doesn't mean this document cannot be changed.
> 
> FYI, right now, if someone did propose such a patch, I would be against
> it being merged due to the possible security implications.

What bothered me here is that when you say "gdb ./program", GDB can do
two things which constitute code execution:

  . run some startup code in the program, for example, load some
    shared libraries, which could trigger execution of some code in
    those libraries, or
  . process various init files, which could invoke code in
    Python/Guile, or call functions inside the debuggee

The second item actually happens when you say "gdb ./emacs" in the src
directory of an Emacs source tree, because there's a .gdbinit file
that which can call functions inside the executable and/or run Python
code.  Are these cases relevant to this part of the policy?

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-04 17:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-06 13:26 Andrew Burgess
2023-11-06 18:55 ` Kevin Buettner
2023-11-06 19:34 ` Simon Marchi
2023-11-06 20:09   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:15     ` Simon Marchi
2023-11-07 12:17       ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-07 14:22         ` Simon Marchi
2023-11-09 14:35   ` Willgerodt, Felix
2023-11-16 17:19   ` Andrew Burgess
2023-11-16 17:27     ` Paul Koning
2023-11-16 21:35       ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-12-08 15:05 ` Andrew Burgess
2023-12-09 10:55   ` Eli Zaretskii
2024-02-04 15:32     ` Andrew Burgess
2024-02-04 17:18       ` Eli Zaretskii [this message]
2024-02-04 17:43         ` Andreas Schwab
2024-02-04 18:56           ` Eli Zaretskii
2024-02-05 11:06         ` Andrew Burgess
2023-12-12  7:27   ` Willgerodt, Felix
2024-02-04 15:36   ` [V3] " Andrew Burgess
2024-02-18 13:55     ` Andrew Burgess
2024-03-27 11:00       ` [V4] " Andrew Burgess
2024-04-08 11:01         ` [V5] " Andrew Burgess
2024-04-09 20:30           ` Tom Tromey
2024-04-10 10:22           ` Willgerodt, Felix
2024-04-26 15:44             ` Andrew Burgess
2024-02-05 21:01   ` Tom Tromey
2024-02-09 15:59     ` Andrew Burgess
2024-02-12 16:43   ` Guinevere Larsen
2024-02-12 17:06     ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2024-02-14 15:03       ` Andrew Burgess

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