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From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@redhat.com>
To: Simon Marchi <simark@simark.ca>,
	Andrew Burgess <aburgess@redhat.com>,
	gdb-patches@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Adding a SECURITY policy for GDB
Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 15:09:44 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201ad6f3-0e7d-4474-88bf-ba60568c8f2e@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e5ad38d4-787c-4c0d-9df7-99f940376cf7@simark.ca>

On 2023-11-06 14:34, Simon Marchi wrote:
> On 11/6/23 08:26, Andrew Burgess wrote:
>>    In the context of local debugging, any bugs in GDB that result in
>>    crossing of a privilege boundary are considered security bugs.  Some
>>    examples of crossing a privilege boundary include; being able to
>>    execute code as an arbitrarily different user, or accessing resources
>>    (e.g. files, sockets, etc) for which the original user would not
>>    normally have access.
> 
> Do you have examples of this?  It seems like any bug in that category would
> be bugs in the platform / OS, not GDB.  If such a bug is possible to exploit
> with GDB, the user could another program to exploit the same bu

That's basically boilerplate to state that *if* such a thing ever 
happens, it will be considered a security issue.  I don't think there 
are any such opportunities for misuse in gdb at the moment, but never 
say never :)

Thanks,
Sid


  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-06 20:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-06 13:26 Andrew Burgess
2023-11-06 18:55 ` Kevin Buettner
2023-11-06 19:34 ` Simon Marchi
2023-11-06 20:09   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar [this message]
2023-11-06 20:15     ` Simon Marchi
2023-11-07 12:17       ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-07 14:22         ` Simon Marchi
2023-11-09 14:35   ` Willgerodt, Felix
2023-11-16 17:19   ` Andrew Burgess
2023-11-16 17:27     ` Paul Koning
2023-11-16 21:35       ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-12-08 15:05 ` Andrew Burgess
2023-12-09 10:55   ` Eli Zaretskii
2024-02-04 15:32     ` Andrew Burgess
2024-02-04 17:18       ` Eli Zaretskii
2024-02-04 17:43         ` Andreas Schwab
2024-02-04 18:56           ` Eli Zaretskii
2024-02-05 11:06         ` Andrew Burgess
2023-12-12  7:27   ` Willgerodt, Felix
2024-02-04 15:36   ` [V3] " Andrew Burgess
2024-02-18 13:55     ` Andrew Burgess
2024-03-27 11:00       ` [V4] " Andrew Burgess
2024-04-08 11:01         ` [V5] " Andrew Burgess
2024-04-09 20:30           ` Tom Tromey
2024-04-10 10:22           ` Willgerodt, Felix
2024-04-26 15:44             ` Andrew Burgess
2024-02-05 21:01   ` Tom Tromey
2024-02-09 15:59     ` Andrew Burgess
2024-02-12 16:43   ` Guinevere Larsen
2024-02-12 17:06     ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2024-02-14 15:03       ` Andrew Burgess

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