From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Paul_Woegerer@mentor.com (Woegerer, Paul)
Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2012 13:50:11 +0200
Subject: [lttng-dev] lttng enable-channel option for blocking
In-Reply-To: <20120427113321.GA6987@Krystal>
References: <4F992213.2090103@mentor.com> <20120426211627.GB1646@Krystal>
	<4F9A4A91.7090102@mentor.com> <20120427113321.GA6987@Krystal>
Message-ID: <4F9A87F3.5090504@mentor.com>

On 04/27/2012 01:33 PM, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote:
> A core difference between ulimit and user-space tracing is that ulimit 
> can only be set within the environment (and access right) of the user 
> running the application. System-wide tracing sessions can be initiated 
> by users member of the "tracing" group -- giving them the ability to 
> potentially DoS an application does not appear to me to be a good 
> security practice. Thoughts ?

Hmm, how would that look in practice ? Lets assume there is the web 
server which was started by an init-script in runlevel 3. How does a 
user that belongs to group tracing hava a chance to DoS the already 
running running web server. As far as I understand the trace session 
concept every tracing user can only see (and affect) the tracing session 
that he initiated. Even if the web server itself runs in a tracing 
session (of user wwwrun) other tracing users wouldn't see it when they 
do a "lttng list", right ?

--
Paul

-- 
Paul Woegerer | SW Development Engineer
Mentor Embedded(tm) | Prinz Eugen Stra?e 72/2/4, Vienna, 1040 Austria
P 43.1.535991320
Nucleus? | Linux? | Android(tm) | Services | UI | Multi-OS

Android is a trademark of Google Inc. Use of this trademark is subject to Google Permissions.
Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries.