From: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com (Mathieu Desnoyers)
Subject: [lttng-dev] lttng enable-channel option for blocking
Date: Fri, 27 Apr 2012 08:43:44 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120427124344.GB21048@Krystal> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4F9A87F3.5090504@mentor.com>
* Woegerer, Paul (Paul_Woegerer at mentor.com) wrote:
> On 04/27/2012 01:33 PM, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote:
>> A core difference between ulimit and user-space tracing is that ulimit
>> can only be set within the environment (and access right) of the user
>> running the application. System-wide tracing sessions can be initiated
>> by users member of the "tracing" group -- giving them the ability to
>> potentially DoS an application does not appear to me to be a good
>> security practice. Thoughts ?
>
> Hmm, how would that look in practice ? Lets assume there is the web
> server which was started by an init-script in runlevel 3. How does a
> user that belongs to group tracing hava a chance to DoS the already
> running running web server. As far as I understand the trace session
> concept every tracing user can only see (and affect) the tracing session
> that he initiated. Even if the web server itself runs in a tracing
> session (of user wwwrun) other tracing users wouldn't see it when they
> do a "lttng list", right ?
Let me clarify the concept of tracing session in lttng 2.0.
We support launching per-user sessiond, which only interact with the
user's applications. That's all fine with security.
Now, we also support a root system-wide sessiond, which allows kernel
and user-space tracing. The "tracing" group has every right to create a
tracing session and trace the kernel and _all_ applications that were
already or will be running on the system.
So given a tracing session can impact _all_ applications running on the
system, we have to be really careful there.
Thanks,
Mathieu
>
> --
> Paul
>
> --
> Paul Woegerer | SW Development Engineer
> Mentor Embedded(tm) | Prinz Eugen Stra?e 72/2/4, Vienna, 1040 Austria
> P 43.1.535991320
> Nucleus? | Linux? | Android(tm) | Services | UI | Multi-OS
>
> Android is a trademark of Google Inc. Use of this trademark is subject to Google Permissions.
> Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries.
>
--
Mathieu Desnoyers
Operating System Efficiency R&D Consultant
EfficiOS Inc.
http://www.efficios.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-04-27 12:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-04-26 10:23 Woegerer, Paul
2012-04-26 21:16 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2012-04-27 7:28 ` Woegerer, Paul
2012-04-27 11:33 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
2012-04-27 11:50 ` Woegerer, Paul
2012-04-27 12:43 ` Mathieu Desnoyers [this message]
2012-04-27 16:15 ` Woegerer, Paul
2012-04-30 14:20 ` Mathieu Desnoyers
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20120427124344.GB21048@Krystal \
--to=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox