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From: Tom Tromey <tromey@redhat.com>
To: Doug Evans <dje@google.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>, gdb-patches@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [RFA] Add $pdir as entry for libthread-db-search-path.
Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 18:40:00 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <m339krwu3l.fsf@fleche.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <BANLkTim6cAbsJXhN6-x4mJL_Mywyk7NN+w@mail.gmail.com> (Doug	Evans's message of "Mon, 2 May 2011 12:50:48 -0700")

>>>>> "Doug" == Doug Evans <dje@google.com> writes:

Doug> Thanks, but I'm still stuck ...

I have gone back and forth on this a few times.

On the one hand, I think people running gdb on an untrusted executable
are acting naively.  I think this is true even for a python-less build
using -nx -- I just don't think gdb or bfd has had enough scrutiny along
these lines to warrant trust.

On the other hand, I think it makes sense to aim for trustworthiness as
a goal, because gdb is a powerful tool for inspecting executables.

I think my overall preference would be for gdb to run securely by
default, with some runtime settings to let users override this.

Also I don't have any problem recognizing that different organizations
build gdb in different ways for their own reasons, and making
accommodations for that.  That is, a configure option to make $pdir the
default seems fine to me, if you want something like that.

Doug> Question for the group at large (and I it doesn't matter to me which
Doug> way we go, I just want to make forward progress ...).
Doug> Do we enforce such security concerns in FSF gdb?

IMO, yes.

Doug> Second,
Doug> If we address these security concerns what is the solution?
Doug> One proposal is on the table.
Doug> [Maintain a list of trusted paths in gdb and have a flag for
Doug> permissive/restrictive mode.
Doug> If in restrictive mode libthread_db and autoloaded python/gdbinit code
Doug> has to come from a trusted path.
Doug> I think one could take this further though.]

It seems reasonable to me.

Doug> Last,
Doug> Do we need to address this before adding my $pdir patch?

IMO, no, but it would be nicer that way.

Tom


  reply	other threads:[~2011-05-06 18:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-04-29  3:59 Doug Evans
2011-04-29 12:36 ` Jan Kratochvil
2011-04-29 16:49   ` Doug Evans
2011-04-29 17:08     ` Jan Kratochvil
     [not found]       ` <BANLkTinagVcXZqvOg80eoFMnyaw9T0OYUw@mail.gmail.com>
2011-05-01 18:34         ` Doug Evans
2011-05-02 19:15           ` Jan Kratochvil
2011-05-02 19:51             ` Doug Evans
2011-05-06 18:40               ` Tom Tromey [this message]
2011-05-09 22:30                 ` Doug Evans

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